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"LAİKLİK ELDEN GİTTİ, LAİKLİK GERİ GELDİ": KÜLTÜREL İSLAM UYGULAMALARINDA SEKÜLERLEŞME

Özet

Bu makale, Türkiye'de siyaset, politik ekonomi, kamu alanı, etik ve kanuni faktörler açısından dindarların sekülerleşmesi konusunun içeriğini incelemeye yönelik bir çalışmadır. Bu çalışmanın önem arz etmesinin başlıca sebebi, bu konuya ait literatürün genellikle son yıllarda, Türkiye'de siyasal alanın "Türkiye Malezya olur mu?" tartışmalarıyla gün yüzüne çıkan, muhafazakarlaşması/ sekülerlikten uzaklaşması üzerine odaklanmış olmasıdır. Bütün bu tartışmalar arasında, dindarların sekülerleşmesi beklenen değişimin tam aksine yeni bir tartışma konusu olarak sahneye çıkmıştır. Dindarların dindarlık üzerine düşünce ve algılarındaki değişiklik, Turner tarafından, "Edimsel Dönüşlülük" diye tanımlanan olgu ile gündelik hayat pratikleri, finans, girişimcilik, moda/ modalaştırma, İslami partilerin politik ajandaları, batılı ve seküler imgeler üzerine oluşturdukları perspektiflerin yeniden oluşumu ve yorumlanması ile gözlemlenebilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sekülerleşme, Müslüman, politik ekonomi, küreselleşme, kapitalizm

"SECULARISM LOST, SECULARISM REGAINED"[2] SECULARIZATION IN THE PRACTICE OF CULTURAL ISLAM

Abstract

The article is set out to examine the content and the reasons of observable changes in Turkey in regard of the secularization of the practicing Muslims within the realms of politics, political economy, public codes, ethical and legal factors. It is of significance since the literature is mainly focused upon the de-secularization of Turkish political system in recent years and this process was named as "Malaysianisation". Among these debates, secularization of the practicing Muslim has emerged on the stage that is just in contrast to what has been imagined as an

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[2] An allegory to the 17 th century English poet John Milton's major works called "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained".

expected change. The change in the extent / dimension / perception of piety (in the concept of secularization of the practicing Muslims) can be observed under the embracing framework and sometimes overlapping umbrella of globalization and capitalism whose effects can be demonstrated in the domains of daily life practices, finance and entrepreneurship, commodification (fashion), political agendas of Islamist parties, pious people’s perspectives on what is secular and western through which the practicing Muslim adapts what Turner calls “Performative Reflexivity” and re-interpret and re-produce the way they practice Islam.

Keywords: Secularization, Muslim, political economy, globalization, capitalism

Introduction

The article is set out to examine the content and the reasons of observable changes in Turkey in regard of the secularization of the practicing Muslims within the realms of politics, political economy, social codes, symbols, ethical and legal factors taking regard of the discussions of “becoming like Malaysia” in the sense of politicization of Islam and loss of secularism when removal of the headscarf ban issue is at hand. The aim is to point out the discrepancy between association of headscarf ban with the politicization of Islam and loss of secularism and the new phenomena which is called the secularization of practicing Muslims which emerged just five years after these hot discussions. The article’s fundamental background is the post-modern type of individual who is of “hybrid plurality” rather than that of “facile uniformity” whose “hybrid plurality” is circumvented and manipulated through the catalyst forces of capitalism and globalization (external forces) (Yılmaz et al., 2002,p.129). Throughout the article, since the terms of religiosity or being pious are relative terms, “pious individual” is going to be referred as the one who claims himself/herself religious or pious. There is no intention to point out whether the changes exemplified within these various cases/realms are of negative or positive implications within the realm of religiosity. The framework within which the observable changes are going to be placed is Turner’s theory of Performative Reflexivity whose account can be summarized as;

> *Performative reflexivity is a condition in which a socio-cultural group, or its most perceptive members acting representatively, turn, bend or reflect back upon themselves, upon the relations, actions, symbols, meanings, and codes, roles, statutes, social structures, ethical and legal rules, and other social-cultural components which make-up their public selves.* (Göl 2009, p.804)

Though the Republican regime endeavored hard to restrict the practice of Islam to the private lives of pious people through control mechanisms and imposed a state Islam (that would serve for the interests of the state rather than that of individuals), it is an undeniable fact that the Republican project failed to erase the inherent nature of Islam whose practice could not /cannot be restricted merely to private life since the nature of Islam is of a public sphere and social life components. The individual facing with various cases/realms/requirements of post-modern world is brought up in a domain of labyrinth in contrast to his ancestors two hundred years ago whose world was of horizontal nature in which the terms of permissible and prohibited are definite and not forced to be within each other through the external and internal forces. The change in the extent/dimension/perception of piety can be observed under the embracing framework and sometimes overlapping umbrella of globalization and capitalism whose effects

can be demonstrated in the domains of daily life practices, finance and entrepreneurship, commodification (fashion), political agendas of Islamist parties, pious people's perspectives on what is secular and western and the way "they amalgamate and manipulate different types of normative orderings" (Yılmaz 2002, p.129).

1. New Islamic Small and Medium Enterprises

In the last three decades, Turkish economy is in the process of transformation from an import-substitution policy to a "trading state" (Kirişçi 2009, p.1). The origins of "trading state" can be linked to Özal's era and his notion of economic interdependence based upon the increase in the import and export volumes reciprocally. The liberal policies conducted by Özal created a new business elite called the Anatolian tigers that is a new emergent class molded with the Anatolian type of religious background (Sufism). The economic transformation process demonstrated a break in the "social coalition between Nationalist View (MG) movement and the marginalized provincial middle classes and the lower class immigrant urbanities" (Gümüşçü, Sert 2009, p.961) since the prevailing economic pragmatism broke the sense of marginalization in social and public sphere as the new business class was able to fly to the foreign countries with the President of the Republic and able to return having made contracts. The sense of locality is transformed into a sense of global entrepreneurship. The primary concern of the devout bourgeois has become the economic activities involved in that resulted in an "identity shaped through economic activities" (Gümüşçü, Sert 2009, p.958) Thus "the increasing number of pious business people and their business associations are the by-products of the liberal policies of Turgut Özal" (Uygur 2009, p.213) Özal's perspectives of Turkish economy conceptualized as the neo-functional economic inter-dependence and pragmatism provided the small and middle entrepreneurs with conservative backgrounds with the opportunity to improve their horizon and integrate more and more into the globalized economy. A profound point in the appreciation of the fast-growing businessmen class is their internalization of "re-interpreted and reproduced understanding of Islamic values" and that of Western ones (Uygur 2009, p.221). The economic development and the growth of trade network in the free-market atmosphere resulted in "an upswing" and "Anatolian bourgeoisie deeply grounded in Turkish Islamic culture, who profess Islam without simultaneously negating Western values and importance of liberal economy" (Karakaş 2007, p.20-21) Though the way they perceived the world and life is based upon the Islamic background and values, the way they engaged in the economic activities is almost utterly a replica of the way their European counterparts engage in. Taking regard of the old and traditional ways through which the pious businessmen ran their business which is of no modern business practices, "pious businessmen started to participate in economic activities in a rational and modern way" (Uygur 2009, p.211) The process starting with the Motherland Party's coming to power, continued in the late 80's and 90's that resulted in "the inclusion of the religiously-oriented into mainstream politics" that gave rise to the Justice and Development Party in the initial years of the 2000's which "espouses a liberal interpretation of secularism by unique aspects of moderate Turkish Sufism" (Tezcür 2007, p.497) The party's initial founders were of membership or strong ties with the Independent Business and Industrialist Organization (Heper 1997, p.35). TUSIAD representing the organization of businessmen with secular backgrounds has made use of its ties with the governments in power, and the statesmen in coherence with the Kemalist establishment were of supportive stance towards the organization that is more visible in the various cases of state-led bids. The rise of political Islam in the embodiment of the Justice and Development Party reversed or at least equalized the conditions

for both of the sides concerned and this situation caused a battle between the two middle classes characterized as the secular and new religious conservative, " the former is skeptical of all Islamism of all sorts and the latter is drawn to pro-modern sort of Islamism" (Somer 2007, p.1275) The clash of two middle classes is observed in regard of the support they give to Turkey's accession to the European Union, and it is made clear that "now most practicing and activist Turkish Muslims advocate it, and believe that 'the Copenhagen criteria' (amr bil ma'ruf), whilst the role of reactionary conservatism is now left to militarist 'deep state' elite" (Yılmaz 2002, p.130) Though "the hard-line" kemalists and secularists are expected to follow Atatürk's ultimate aim of "advancing to the level of contemporary developed civilizations", it is the new Islamic bourgeois aspiring for the implementation of 'the Copenhagen Criteria'. The association of 'the Copenhagen Criteria' with the Islamic notion of "amr bil ma'ruf" is another aspect demonstrating the extent to which the former provincial Islamic groups has re-interpreted the Islamic values, in which the re-interpreted or moderated Islamic vision is devoid of negating what has nothing to do with Islam, or Islamic references at all. In regard of the ethics/norms/values and political culture, the political stances that these two battling middle-classes have can be demonstrated in Shively's (2008) words;

> *It seems fair to argue that it is the Kemalists themselves who are the real Islamists, since they attempt to impose by law and force a particular interpretation of Islam, while the moderate AK party and its supporters, such as the students in the Koran course, are closer to true civil secularists, since they have articulated a desire to allow for less state-control and more freedom of religious practice.* (Shively, 2008, p.706)

It is also in the establishment document of Independent Business and Industrialist Organization that makes their support clearly-stated for accession to the European Union that will open up new western markets where the profits are more guaranteed in comparison to the markets in the Middle East to which (already) devout bourgeois is of deeper trade networks. As in Başkan's words (2010); "Turkey's Islamic business elites have become 'contingent democrats' to protect their material interests (Başkan 2010, p.400)" The term 'contingency' can also be explained further through the words of Demiralp (2009);

> *MUSIAD's agenda was shaped by structural interests rather than religious ones, and many MUSIAD members would consider joining TUSIAD if asked, due to TUSIAD's capacity, prestigious and powerful history, and its private relation with the state.* (Demiralp 2009, p.321)

Another point in support for free-market and less state control among pious businessmen has much to do with the acceptation of the notion of democracy, which is also obvious in Karakaş (2007), who gives reference to the words of Ali Bulaç whose views are of significance since he is a well-known intellectual affecting the thoughts of pious people; "Secularization of Islam from within has already passed the point of no return, and that democracy is also accepted among Islamists," (Karakaş 2007,p.30)

2. Capitalist Patterns and Re-philosophized Islamic Jurisprudence

The rules and patterns of capitalist business life and Islamic jurisprudence are put into the same pocket and the pious businessmen tend to associate his business with what is sacred.

Though Islamic jurisprudence is clear in the issue of interest, the pious businessman (coded as RG2) who needs to survive in capitalist business patterns claims that;

> *I mean according to our belief, in some unavoidable situations "haram" turns into "helal". Ok, interest is prohibited. I could not pay my electricity bill on time. Now look it is the rule of trading. Which one is right? Closing the factory down, or getting some bank loan and surviving ? According to my small brain I would say rescuing the factory is more important* (Uygur 2009, p.220)

Though Uygur (2009) does not delve into the philosophy of what RG2 claims, one might argue that it is also worth delving into it since he makes an allusion to an Islamic rule however this allusion also seems to include some circumvention. The allusion is to the general idea of 'forbidden' turning into 'helal' as in the case of a man/woman who is in an empty desert, for whom eating a piece of pig-meat enough to make him survive is permissible. The pious businessman makes an allusion to a sample which is inherent in Islamic culture. He puts the factory in the place of the starving man in the desert and endeavors to justify his deed of using interest. One can also observe the subordination of Islamic jurisprudence under reason and it can be argued that reason ("my small brain") symbolizes the secularization of the practicing Muslim when it comes to choose between the capitalist business patterns and Islamic jurisprudence. In coherence with the idea of interest rate being 'forbidden', Islamic bourgeois created its banking system which is functioning within a capitalist market and in harmony with its rules. Uygur(2009) demonstrates that there is still an ongoing debate whether the interest-free banks are in a genuine coherence with the Islamic jurisprudence and he makes reference to Timur Kuran's *'The Economic Impacts of Islamic Fundamentalism'* which claims that "there is no significant difference between working mechanisms of interest-free banks and ordinary banks" (Uygur, 2009, p.220) Interest-free banks whose customers in general are of Islamic background, have the tendency to internalize and re-produce the way their ordinary counterparts work. Demiralp's (2009) interview with Al Baraka General Secretary Utku in 2005, signals that "the stock exchange is not a hazardous tool, a share is a commodity, so it is okay to buy or sell it unless you use it for speculative purposes"(Demiralp ,2009, p.323). Pious businessman's view on the credits given by the state-banks is another point which is presented as a trap by Özel who was MUSIAD consultant in 1997, since "the state charges interest, even if small, with an aim to dissuade pious citizens and to help those with certain ideological tendency" (Adas, 2006, p.122). But the trap represented here is not pious businessmen benefiting from credits charged interest, but their being prevented from using it. The trap is, ironically, the state-led banks' support for the secular businessmen, whereas dissuading the ones with Islamic background by making use of the interest. Adas (2006) also makes it clear that some "prophet's saying" is re-interpreted to justify the "work ethic". "Those who live two succeeding days the same way are at loss indeed." which is interpreted as " if you employ two workers today, you must employ four tomorrow" (Adas ,2006, p.129) though it used to be interpreted as verifying the ways of praying which is the only way to be the beloved subject of the God. The "work ethic" that the pious businessman refers to, foresees richness as a tool to become more powerful and visible. Adas (2006) makes reference to pious businessman view with the words of "we ought to take the take the treasures of God from their hands and we ought to possess them. If we do so, the rich will be granted the status of martyr" (Adas, 2006, p.131) The analysis of these words point out that pious businessman justifies the greed for being richer to achieve a further aim, and he makes allusion to the martyrs in Jihad, people killed for the sake of God.

3. New Commodities for the New Conservative Consumer Culture

The new bourgeois formed its own consumer culture in harmony with the capitalist way of handling the business, and this consumer culture had "close links with the politics of identity, small urban shopkeepers and founders of metropolitan companies that created a market for their life-style and ideology" (Yashin, 2002, p.223) That is where the new consumer culture demonstrates "performative reflexivity" in which the new visible bourgeois "make up their own public selves" based upon their relation to the free-market, neo-liberal, globalized and capitalist forms and the new public-self is closer to the carnal world rather than that of Islamic notions (Göl, 2009, p.804) The cultural Islam has become more and more visible in daily financial relations and the rising new middle class seemed to be devoid of any hesitation to internalize the patterns in which the capital is utilized in a capitalist economy. It seems fair to argue that Turkish modernity is based upon "cultural Islam co-existing with postmodern, highly globalized and consumptionist cultural patterns" (Keyman, 2007,p.224) These pious business people also refashioned the framework of 'Islamic ethic' in a way that is inherently a component of capitalist economies. Uygur (2009)makes it clear that "pious business people refer to quasi-Puritan values, such as hard work, thriftiness, honesty and call these 'Islamic ethic', though none of them are exclusively Islamic" (Uygur, 2009, p.217) As stated above in Yılmaz's (2002) words, they "amalgamate, manipulate", re-interpret and re-produce different types of "normative orderings" and internalize them in their daily life, financial/trade engagements. The transformation of the 'Islamic ethic', its being likened to what is inherent in the birth of capitalism, provides justification in running a business in harmony with capitalist patterns rather than that of Islamic ones. In Yashin's (2002) words, "political economy is intrinsic to the construction of cultures" (Yashin, 2002, p.225). In other words, political economy is the primordial force in refashioning the Islamic culture. While taking regard of the commodification that the pious businessmen or shop-keepers are engaged in, one should take cognizance of the intertwined relationship between the political economy and culture that is summarized in Yashin's words as;

> *Culture has too often been conceptualized as distinct from the domain of commodification. Anthropologists have written numerous ethnographies of the disruption and transformation of culture through the incoming forces of capitalism. Like the concepts of structure and change, products of binarism, the categories of culture and economy too have been pit against each other to overlook their inherency. When culture has been too easily mapped onto what is local, economy even after centuries of capitalism has been associated with what is Western, and therefore with what is external to and what is supposedly contradicts authentic local culture* (Yashin, 2002, p.223).

The Islamic culture is transformed and re-produced in such a way that the business-making patterns that pious bourgeois hold is of more of a secularist pattern rather than that of Islamic culture. Some of the brands selling Islamic clothing such as overcoats and headscarves for women, had the brand names such as Tevhid, Hak and Tekbir. These names are utilized to "invoke Islam" and to attract and attribute to the attention of rising middle class whose preferences are reshaped in accordance with the refashioning styles (Yashin et al., 2002,p. 246) Fashion is the catalyst in a capitalist system that makes it possible to create a medium that makes people think that what they bought last year is obsolete and they need a new one that is 'fashionable one' that makes them feel respectable, proud and presentable which are utterly

against the Islamic notion of humbleness. Yashin (2002) also makes it clear that one of the companies mentioned above "reached its clients through well-advertised fashion shows" that is another point in demonstrating the intertwined relationship between Islamic bourgeois and capitalist system. The image a 'fashion show' invokes is almost utterly linked to the image of models whose bodies (color of the eye, good appearance) are utilized to present what is in 'fashion'. The images used in fashion shows are also signs of modernity that is made clear with the words of Yashin (2002) as; "those blue eyes that represented 'modernity' to Turks, were employed not only in the secularist fashion industry, but also in Islamist sectors that aspired to be Muslim and modern". (Yashin, 2002,p.245)Taking regard of the fashion shows as having Western origin, one of the pious businessmen interviewed by Uygur (2009)and coded as RG2 claims that "when we look at their (European) business, it's like our religion'' (Uygur, 2009, p.219). It shows the extent to which pious businessmen's perspectives upon the Islamic system of economy has changed. It is also evident in Uygur's (2009) interview that the concept of Islamic economy business is referred as both 'unrealistic' and 'inapplicable' system in the modern times. Çarkoğlu (2010) refers to a survey inquiring the extent of support for Sheriat-based religious state and one can appreciate that the ones favoring this kind of state are marginalized since;

> *According to a survey held in February 1999, those who do not favor the establishment of a Şeriat-based religious state in Turkey form a group of about 68 percent of total respondents, while about 11 per cent of total respondents did not express a preference.* (Çarkoğlu, 2010, p.118)

Though extravagancy is prohibited in Islam, fashion shows give the idea that what was bought last year is not new anymore, and the fashion shows in the western world were criticized to be full of vanity, pride, showing off and materialism and these values have nothing to do with Islamic values. As Bilgin (2003) claims, there is a certain "differentiation between what the devout called permissible (helal) or forbidden by religion" Islamic bourgeois' use of fashion shows demonstrates the extent that the capitalist forms and patterns make them internalize what is worldly. In the fashion shows of these companies mentioned above, the type of models who are covered with headscarf and overcoats are of western type/appearance. It is more of capitalist patterns (fashion) rather than traditional Islamic culture that give impulse to the activities of pious-businessmen. The interviewee in Yashin's (2002) article indicates "the commodified quality of women's clothes and modification of styles to match those popularized and invented by the big veiling companies" (Yashin, 2002, p.241) The shopkeeper indicates the influence of fashion with the highlighted words; "Everyone wore silk until they had it up to here with silk, then one of the big companies put the stoned silk models on the market. We now have to produce that, too." (Yashin, 2002, p.242) He feels the necessity to produce 'stoned silk models' since the fashion of the year creates 'a need' for the clients. The intrinsic relationship between cultural-normative orderings of Islam and political culture is worded in Adas'(2006) article with the words following;

> *The relationship between Islam and entrepreneurship in Turkey is reconstructed and reconfigured resulting in a dialectical process wherein capitalism and Islamic culture interpenetrate and transform each other* (Adas, 2006, p.115)

It seems fair to argue that both the behaviors of customers and the shopkeeper are invoked through a secular mechanism in which production patterns and customer interests are in

circumvention of Islamic culture's normative orderings. Covering means covering the contours of the body so that the person who covers does not lure people's attention which is also a sign of trashing the pride embedded in human nature. However, taking regard of the 'stoned silk models', it can be argued that the Islamic normative ordering is circumvented and amalgamated in coherence with what the fashion 'preaches' and fashion emerges as a milieu in which the practicing Muslims invest. In coherence with the fashion shows and the European models in headscarves with make-up, it is not a big surprise that the young generation of the devout bourgeoisie has the similar appearance which is a sign of internalization of what is western and secular as a part of Islamic culture. Fashion as a secular item has become a part of the daily life of practicing Muslims and "the new goods create new forms of 'being' or 'identity', crafting and selling 'Turkish authenticity' in what they wore and ate, although market-produced" (Yashin, 2002, p.245). What is produced by the capitalist market is embedded into the Islamic culture and "Islamist identities in contemporary Turkey are products of manufacture rather than that of some primordial "Turkishness" (Yashin ,2002,p241). The devout clients with growing financial power reshape their identities through the manufacture they sell and buy. The association of manufacture with the local culture forms a new type of 'local' culture that is thought to be genuine and traditional, though the case is not so.

4. Secularization in the Daily and Public Life Practices

Rethinking of Bilgin's (2003) words about the change between what the devout people called "permissible" and "forbidden" by religion, changing opinions and attitudes towards music is a domain in which "the intensity of the differentiation concerned can be an answer for the extent to which the notion of piety has changed" (Bilgin,2003,p.200). Daily life practices of pious people in Turkey are the most apparent apparel that can be attributed to the observable secularization of the practicing Muslims in Turkey. Aggressive attack of the entertainment world, motorized by the processes of globalization and capitalism, could not be resisted by the practicing Muslims. The local culture of the practicing Muslim is being given a new shape including difference in the limits of what is forbidden or permissible. Thus, practicing Muslims' behaviors towards music and their changing attitudes are symptoms of external forces that influence the natural local traditions /environments that are getting flattened. In Islamic jurisprudence (canon law), "music is not permissible since it includes the voice of women and instruments" and "the first private radio stations established by the pious people played merely hymns" (Bilgin,2003,p.202) However, nowadays pious people in Turkey also listen to various kinds of music and "hymns are now being put into different music forms ranging from authentic to pop" (Bilgin,2003,p.202)

Performative reflexivity that the pious people internalize in their daily lives is also a sort of flattening mechanism that likens the local practicing Muslims to a "globalized" citizen whose taste (likes and dislikes) becomes more and more like an individual whose background is lack of Islamic local culture. A similar kind of amalgamation and circumvention can also be clearly observed in the broadcasts of TV channels that were "established by the pious people had very low rating grades during the first year" (Bilgin,2003,p.203). During the first few years, the programs were based upon the discussions of religious subjects, broadcast of hymns and daily news. The aim was to prevent people from being indulged in the hazardous effects of the other TV channel programs and to give some didactic messages and to intervene into the world of the TV watching pious audience. The news broadcasted were also devoid of any kind of violence scene since it is against the notion of Islam and Islamic culture within which 'peace' (the

genuine meaning of the term, Islam) is mostly appreciated. Bilgin (2003) also makes it clear that "these programs could not be a good alternative". Due to the continuance of the low-rating grades, the channels concerned started to make use of serials whose content is of violence. Take, for instance the newspaper called Zaman, which "did not have any sport page or section when it started to be circulated in 1986" (Bilgin,2003, p.209) Nowadays, it has 3-4 pages alleviated for sport section. The goal of making use of media was to be able to give messages to more and more people, however the need to reach more and more people required these TV channels to transform themselves in a way that it can also reach to moderate people. It is also evident that this process created a contradiction that is stated as "in contradiction to the aim of transforming the others, it transformed the pious people's themselves in a short and effective time period" (Bilgin,2003,p.212).

5. The Gap Between the Townsmen and Villagers

The gap between the townsmen and villagers refers to the gap in the degree of traditional practice of cultural Islam. The re-philosophized cultural Islam is expected to be more tangible in the urban areas since the external forces of capitalism and globalization are more influential in these milieus rather than rural areas. The process of 'transformation' has made the pious people receptive to the secularism. The receptiveness is observable in the choices and attributions that pious people make in different sorts of cases. It is also evident that the transformation and the increase in the receptivity towards secularism is more tangible and visible in the urbanities compared to the rural areas. It is also supportive of the thesis presented in regard of the "performative reflexivity" that is a prominent result of the external and internal forces. Urban areas characterized with more facilities and intensified human interaction is obviously the milieu where the public-selves needs to be performed more intensively. Stirling (1958) refers to this phenomena as the "widening gap between town and village" and makes it clear that "religious difference is perhaps the most important one" (Stirling,1958,p.407) The external and internal forces are more tangible within the urban mediums. It is the intensified interaction between people in cities that give them a higher chance to imitate what they are exposed to in fashion shows. The gap is also evident in Magnarella's words (1970) where he claims that "only 13.2 per cent of the villagers and 3.9 per cent of the townsmen put forth fatalistic reasons like fate and chance whereas the rest makes reference to ability and hard work". (Magnarella,1970,p.237) It is not a surprise that hard work and ability are also the terms utilized by the newly rising pious middle-class whose work ethic is very close to that of Calvinistic work ethic. The transformation is also evident in the choices that pious people make. It is fair to argue that pious people endeavor to armor themselves towards the performance of public-selves which is in coherence with the demands a secular person. On the one hand, secular people tend to send their children to private schools with a western type of education, on the other hand, Heper (1997) makes it clear that some Imam Hatip schools have been a focus of interest and "they owed their popularity to its English language instruction rather than to its teaching of Islam"(Heper, 1997, p.35). The school's popularity stems from the fact that learning English language promises more benefits for the future than that of Islamic education. Same kind of performative reflexivity finds its place in the prays that include "demanding money and more income", "finding a good partner and marriage", "wishing victory for the favorite football team" and "success in an exam" which is a decent sample for intertwined milieu of religion and worldly life (Çarkoğlu, 2009, p.30).

Conclusion

It is still debated whether the new Islamic middle-class has failed to give a viable response to the globalization and capitalist system or not. The article, far from endeavoring to find out an answer to this debate, tries to demonstrate the intrinsic and intertwined relationship between capitalism and the secularization of the practicing Muslims. It also points out that the increasing conservativeness is within the process of secularization since it is not exempt from the forces of capitalism and globalization. The new small and medium Islamic enterprises internalized the patterns of capitalist system that led to some significant transformations such as; re-philosophized Islamic jurisprudence, the use of western and secular notions of fashion and new Islamic commodities, secularization in the daily and public life and a visible gap between the townsmen and villagers in terms of the internalization of the traditional Islamic culture.

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